Boeing whistleblower points to past electrical wiring defects in 737 Max

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A prominent Boeing whistleblower released new documents Thursday that point to confusion and chaos in the company’s Renton, Washington, factory as it built two 737 Max planes that later crashed, killing 346 people on board in 2018 and 2019.

Production issues back then still affect Max planes flying today, alleged Ed Pierson, a former Boeing manager.

The released documents include an internal Boeing record that shows a slew of electrical issues were discovered as Boeing assembled the Ethiopian Airlines jet that crashed in 2019.

A report from the Federal Aviation Administration in 2018 found employees in another Boeing facility in Everett, Washington, where workers prepare electrical parts that are later put on the planes, were pushed to move too fast and produced defective pieces.

Communications between Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines show the plane that later crashed experienced an in-flight safety incident months before the fatal accident. Boeing told the airline that the December 2018 incident was likely the result of an electrical error, the records show.

The whistleblower, Pierson, said the records and the earlier safety incident bolster his view that the deadly crash of the Ethiopian jet may have been initiated by an electrical problem. That problem traces back to production issues with electrical wire bundles that Pierson has highlighted.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety, an advocacy group that Pierson formed after the crashes to investigate commercial aviation, released the documents on Thursday.

Pierson said Boeing should have shared the documents with regulatory investigators looking into the two deadly Max crashes, but did not.

“Boeing knew the manufacturing was an absolute disaster,” he said.

Pierson worked at Boeing for more than 10 years and served as a senior manager coordinating fixes for assembly problems on the 737 program. Before he left the company in 2018, he had complained of safety risks from the frantic production pace that summer, months before the first of the fatal crashes. Boeing leadership ignored his concerns, he said.

After the crashes, he repeatedly alleged manufacturing defects played a role in the incidents and maintained Thursday that such defects in the current fleet make the Max still unsafe.

The FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board and international regulators have not agreed.

In both crashes, an error with then-new software — the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System or MCAS — caused the plane to nosedive. Boeing recently pleaded guilty to misleading safety regulators about MCAS and how much training pilots would need to fly safely.

In the case of the Ethiopian crash, the NTSB and its French counterpart concluded that it wasn’t an electrical error but a bird strike damaging a sensor that likely triggered the MCAS software.

The U.S. agency disputed a report from Ethiopian authorities that said the sensor was triggered by “production quality defects.”

Pierson sent the newly disclosed records to the NTSB, the FAA and the Department of Justice in July, he said.

On Thursday, in response to questions about the now-public documents, the FAA said it reviews safety concerns, reports and records it receives and that questions related to the Ethiopian Airlines crash should be directed to the NTSB. The NTSB said questions should be directed to Ethiopian authorities.

Boeing said in a statement that it “fully cooperated and provided relevant information to the investigation” after the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 accident. “We defer to the investigative agencies for further information.”



 

History of electrical issues

Pierson insists the newly released documents point to a history of electrical issues at Boeing’s facilities that could have contributed to both fatal crashes and may affect other Maxes still flying.

The communications between Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines show in December 2018, the plane experienced an “uncommanded roll,” or an incident when the plane rolls on its own, which can startle the pilot and lead to loss of control of the plane.

The December 2018 incident occurred just weeks after Ethiopian Airlines received the aircraft and a few months before the jet crashed.

The communication record shows Boeing told the airline it suspected the roll was caused by an electrical fault and instructed the airline to check the plane’s wiring.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety also released a copy of the Shipside Action Tracker — an internal database Boeing uses to document, track and resolve issues when building a plane — from 2018 production of the Ethiopian Airlines plane that crashed. That database shows electric parts were misinstalled and mislabeled, and that there was miscommunication between employees about the work that was done.

A 2018 FAA investigation of Boeing’s Electrical Systems Responsibility Center in Everett, where Boeing produces electrical components for its planes, similarly found issues with the facility.

In a copy of the report released Thursday by the foundation, the FAA said Boeing management forced employees to work within time limits that could lead to defective parts leaving the electrical center. It said workers had one minute to pre-inspect some parts.

It also found that “rework,” the process of taking pieces apart to fix an earlier error before putting it all back together, was not verified by quality assurance.

 

Ongoing production problems

The allegations of confusion and chaos in Boeing’s Renton factory mirror much of what has become public after the panel blowout on another Boeing 737 Max jet in January.

In that case, Boeing workers had to remove a panel, known as a door plug, to repair rivets. But, when reinstalling the panel, four bolts meant to secure it in place were missing, leading the piece to blow off the jet at 16,000 feet in the air.

Boeing has said it does not have a paper trail of work and rework on the panel.

Since the January incident, Boeing has said it will no longer allow planes to move through its factories with missing or defective parts and incomplete jobs. But, on Thursday, Pierson called the steps Boeing has taken so far “woefully inadequate.”

Seattle Times aerospace reporter Dominic Gates contributed to this story.